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Abstract 
 
Food manufactures often face difficult purchasing decisions when multiple business constraints 
and several bidding options affect them.  The objective of the buying organization is to ensure 
corn sweeteners are purchased so as to minimize the total operational cost. To do so, the 
purchasing department compared the conventional method of a sealed-bid auction to, first, a 
reverse auction with single-item bids and, then, to a reverse auction with bundled bids. The 
senior author—as director of corporate purchasing—researched, proposed and executed the 
combinatorial auction to source corn sweeteners for a large, processed-meat manufacturer who 
uses large quantities of four corn sweeteners at its eight processing plants located across the 
United States.  Two buying techniques were — electronic reverse auctions and combinatorial 
reverse electronic auctions. First, we present the difficulties of using a reverse combinatorial 
auction and describe the method used to obtain the least cost combination of bids that satisfies 
buyer’s RFQ. Second, we show the progression of the bidding rounds and estimate the savings 
from this combinatorial auction as compared to what the company did with either a manual or a 
reverse single item auction. Finally, we address the diminishing marginal returns of repeated 
usage of CeRA, and describe how this food company advanced from the auction setting to a risk-
management-based procurement process. 
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Introduction 
 
A firm can outperform its competitors by being able either to charge a higher price or to produce 
at less cost or both (Porter 1998). To be able to charge a higher price the firm must offer greater 
customer value. To achieve the latter, the firm must realize more efficiencies than its 
competitors.  Such efficiencies may be realized internally or externally—through working with 
its supply chain partners.  The latter is the subject here; specifically, cost savings through 
purchasing. Among the ways to reduce purchase cost is to incentivize suppliers: first by being 
asked to compete—head-to-head—and, second, to find cost savings through bundling bids.   
 
The customer’s choice of procurement method determines the intensity of bid competition and 
bidder’s flexibility to bundle items in a customer’s RFQ.  When the customer offers bidders’ 
flexibility to assemble from an RFQ their most favorable bundles, and suppliers compete to win 
the bid(s); flexibility gains to suppliers will, at least in part, be returned to the customer. 
However, allowing for such flexibility makes it difficult for the customer to identify the least-
cost set of bids that satisfies, exactly, its RFQ.  Simple, electronic reverse auctions (eRAs)—
where the industrial customer requests single item or fixed-bundle bids are popular because of 
their ease of use.  Such auctions encourage price competition among bidders, but preclude bid 
flexibility.   
 
Although allowing bidders to make up and bid on their own bundles can produce significant cost 
savings, doing so complicates, greatly, the bid evaluation process, which increases bid-
evaluation costs and lengthen auction response time, especially when done manually.  The 
electronic, reverse combinatorial auction, implemented here, provides the bundling flexibility 
and calculates “winning bids” to give rapid response to bidders so as to promote bid competition.  
 
The senior author—as director of corporate purchasing—researched, proposed and executed the 
combinatorial auction to source sweeteners for a large, processed-meat manufacturer who uses 
large quantities of four corn sweeteners at its eight processing plants located across the United 
States. Those corn sweeteners help to bind the meat together add flavor and promote the 
fermentation essential to the production of semi-dry cured and dry-cured sausages and processed 
meats, such as hot dogs, and bologna. Corn Sweeteners, made from the starch of maize (corn 
U.S.), are composed mainly of fructose, which is equal to glucose in caloric value, but sweeter 
and less expensive.   
 
The combinatorial auction allowed each qualified supplier to structure, within the specifications 
of the RFQ, bundles of sweeteners and plant delivery locations to take advantage of that 
supplier’s unique synergies in production and delivery. Corn sweeteners, for example, are the 
result of some joint production, of corn syrup, crystalline fructose, glucose—commonly referred 
to as dextrose—and two formulations of high fructose corn syrups—42 percent and 55 percent 
fructose. Some the manufacturers are corn millers while others are just distributors of dry 
product.  Likewise, delivery transportation options may offer savings that could affect the bid 
price. For example, there may be savings in delivering different products, all at once to, a plant 
or of delivering, on a milk run, to a cluster of two or more plants.  Allowing each bidder to 
choose how to form its bidding bundles makes it possible for the bidder to exploit its efficiencies 
from synergies in production and transportation.  
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Problem Setting 
 
The study subject is a meat manufacturer who produces both fresh and processed meats.  Some 
of its fresh meat production is used to make processed meats, such as cured, deli, and smoked 
meats.  Beside fresh meat, a major direct input is the class of corn sweeteners—corn syrup, corn 
syrup solids, dextrose and liquid dextrose. The business operates eight processed meat plants, 
each using corn sweeteners. Depending on the products produced a plant may require four or 
fewer sweeteners. 
 
Corn sweetener suppliers often submit multiple bids ranging from a bid to supply a single item to 
a bid to supply a bundle of items. The supplier’s bids are based on price, and non-price 
performance facets, which suggest the supplier’s bids, take into consideration its transportation, 
purchasing power, or product quality advantages. Normally, purchasing departments organize 
bids into predetermine lot sizes. The problem is that buyers often force suppliers into 
unnecessary constraints, and the suppliers’ bids are not the best for minimizing costs or reducing 
the cycle time needed to evaluate bid. The original process of selecting the most competitive bid 
was complicated and inefficient; therefore, multi-attribute purchasing presented decision 
problems for the buyer.  
 
Prior to this work, the company’s purchasing office used manual auctions by corresponding with 
bidder through the US Mail. As an employee of the meat manufacturer, the senior author 
identified over 700 different direct inputs used by the processed meat division and searched for a 
means to improve purchasing by reducing combined purchase and transaction costs.  The study 
led to the introduction of electronic reverse auctions (eRA) and combinatorial electronic reverse 
auctions (CeRA).  At the heart of the concerns were the buyer’s inability to properly evaluate 
bids with multiple attributes and eRA’s would affect the non-price performance aspects of 
suppliers such as delivery and flexibility, which are often promoted by suppliers.  
 
The objective of the meat manufacturer is to ensure corn sweeteners are purchased so as to 
minimize the total operational cost. To do so, the purchasing department compared the 
conventional method of a sealed-bid auction to, first, a reverse auction with single-item bids and, 
then, to a reverse auction with bundled bids.  But first, we present the difficulties of using a 
reverse combinatorial auction and describe the method used to obtain the least cost combination 
of bids that satisfies buyer’s RFQ. Second, we show the progression of the bidding rounds and 
estimate the savings from this combinatorial auction as compared to what the company did with 
either a manual or a reverse single item auction. Finally, we address the diminishing marginal 
returns of repeated usage of CeRA, and describe how this food company advanced from the 
auction setting to a risk-management-based procurement process.   
 
Purchasing Inputs for Food Manufacturing 
 
Purchases can be classified according to two broad categories: manufacturing (direct) inputs and 
operating (indirect) inputs. Direct inputs are raw materials, which make up the finished product 
or packaging materials that come in direct contact with the finished product.  Direct inputs are 
purchased from industry-specific suppliers and distributors, and manufacturing cannot proceed 
without them. Indirect products do not come in direct contact with the finished goods, but are 
overhead inputs of maintenance, repair, and operation (MRO) goods and services. 
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Because purchases of indirect input usually small, but many, the associated transactions costs are 
a high proportion of total purchase cost relative the direct inputs.  Thus, for indirect inputs, 
businesses have adopted two methods that reduce, dramatically, the transactions cost with 
indirect input procurement: P-Cards and eProcurement. P-cards are special commercial credit 
cards that control for the types of expenditure a card holder may make based vendor category 
and risk category and provides for electronic data transfer from the card company to the owner of 
the cards. eProcurement is based on a catalog and price list negotiated between the vendor and 
the procuring business.  To purchase such inputs, an employee browses the online catalogs, adds 
item(s) to a shopping cart and submits a requisition, electronically, to purchasing. Completed 
requisitions are routed for review or approval via electronic workflow.  Approved requisitions 
will generate a purchase order, which is transmitted to the vendor. All other approved 
eProcurement requisitions are routed to purchasing agents for review and processing into 
purchase orders.   
For direct inputs purchasing may use spot transactions—likely using manual or electronic 
auction—or contracts with food brokers, ingredient distributors, or input manufacturers. In some 
cases, the food company may have some form of ownership through vertical integration, 
partnerships, or joint ventures to produce its proprietary direct inputs. Business-to-Business 
online bidding events help to communicate prices between the buyer and seller much faster. The 
negotiations are set in real-time dynamic auctions between a buyer and several suppliers, who 
compete against each other, online; lowering their bid amounts (Beall et al. 2003) until the 
lowest competitive market prices is reached. Price descends during a reverse auction as opposed 
to the traditional English auction, run by the seller and where the highest bid is the “winning bid” 
at close of the auction. The purchases of major inputs will be a few, large transactions.  
However, the many minor inputs may create relatively high transactions cost. That is because the 
individual purchases of such direct input are small and numerous as compared to high volume 
major inputs. For the minor inputs the cost of face-to face purchasing or manual bid taking are 
high relative to the cost of the input. Stated differently transaction costs make up a significant 
proportion of the total order cost. Just as with sourcing indirect inputs, reducing transactions cost 
is an important means to reducing the cost of minor direct costs. Internet auctions are one 
method to reduce transaction cost, yet promote price competition among suppliers.   
Literature Review 
 
The literature on eRAs is particularly rich in examining competition, price-based criterion, 
leadership, and specifiability. Kaufmann and Carter’s 2004 case-study covers the circumstances 
under which electronic or face-to-face negotiations are appropriate. Foroughi, Kocakulah and 
Williams 2008; Hawkins, Randall, and Wittmann 2010; Huang et al. 2010 use models to 
describe the extent by which a firm’s leadership and price-based selection criterion influences 
the decision of both suppliers and buyers to adopt eRA’s. The beneficial and controversial 
aspects of eRAs in buyer-seller dealings emphasize the impact of opportunistic behavior on 
strategic supply relationships (Beall, Carter, Carter, Germer, Hendrick, Jap, Kaufmann, 
Maciejewski, Monczka and Petersen 2003). Pearcy, Giunipero and Wilson 2007; Caniëls and 
van Raaij 2009 focus on the factors that affect buyers' information processing and decision-
making in e-RAs. Smeltzer and Carr 2003; Häubl and Popkowski, Leszczyc 2004; Ding, 
Eliashberg, Huber and Saini 2005 conclude product or service specifications must be clear and 
comprehensive to provide incentives for suppliers to participate in the auction.  ERAs provide 
some measure of resolving the buyer’s problem. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence have 
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shown that eRAs can lower purchase prices and reduce the amount of time it takes for feedback- 
evaluation-selection of a winning bid (Aberdeen Group 2005; Ariba.com 2012). Ariba, a 
software supplier, reported savings using reverse auctions in the 5% to 10% range. Companies 
that report successful use of reverse auctions include General Electric (Kwasnica and Thomas 
2002), Mars (Hohner et al. 2003), Owens Corning (Moozakis 2001), and major retail chains such 
as Wal-Mart (Sheffi 2004). With a single-unit reverse auction the buyer requests from its 
approved suppliers a single-quote bid for either one item or on all items. 
 
Purchasing using single-bid auctions, however, limits competition and reduces supplier 
flexibility. The single-bid auction is an all or none option:  bid to supply all on the RFQ or make 
no bid at all. Requesting a single bid on a bundle of items or on a single item to be delivered to a 
number of locations could be too constraining because at least some potential bidders may not 
want, nor be able to fulfill all that is on the RFQ.  Conversely, if each item is bid separately, a 
supplier may not be able to provide its best offer because its best offer might be contingent on 
getting the bid on some combination of items. Four in five Fortune 1000 companies have tried e-
sourcing tools, but only one in five have gone beyond price-focused electronic RFQ and reverse 
auctions to tackle more complex categories (Ariba 2012). Here is where the combinatorial 
auction shines. It allows a bidder to choose which RFQ items and shipment locations to include 
in its bid (Sandholm et al. 2002). Note, that bundle may be not just for selected inputs, but also 
for selected delivery locations. So far, the combinatorial auction would appear to offer no serious 
complication; however, the complication enters when the buyer begins to evaluate the bids 
received to find the set of offers that satisfies the RFQ at least cost (Aberdeen Group 2005). That 
is because each potential supplier on each bid makes its own choice of what to offer and not 
offer, and purchasing must decipher what combination of bids satisfies the RFQ at least cost. 
 
Combinatorial Auction Processing 
 
To find the least-cost solution for such a combinatorial auction, one might use either linear or 
integer programming, depending upon the bidding rules.  Use linear programming when a bid 
can be accepted in whole or fractionally. Use integer programming, when a bid can be accepted 
only in total or not at all. Since each bid is treated as a single activity, mathematically, each 
activity can take on only two values (0 and 1) with integer programming. For the least-cost 
solution, the combination of all bids with activity values of 1 will provide a set that satisfies the 
RFQ at least cost.   With linear programming, the least cost solution may include activity values 
from and including zero to one. Model constraints are set to assure that all RFQ items are 
satisfied—item, location and time period, if specified. The model can be constrained, further. For 
example, the RFQ may require only one supplier per plant. Likewise, other bid limitations or 
specifications could be represented by model constraints, such as no supplier can supply more 
than 95 percent. Such constraints are known as provide a rich bidding language because it offers 
bidders choices on a range of options. 
 
Online reverse auctions as a part of the electronic sourcing portfolio and more advanced 
electronic souring tool: combinatorial expressive bidding, which is a part called optimization 
technology or decision-support tools. The tool uses advanced mathematical algorithms to very 
quickly analyze unlimited business constraints and what-if scenarios (Sandholm 2002). The food 
industry buyer uses the tool to allow suppliers to creatively develop bids that make most efficient 
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use of their production capability. With the expressive bidding tool, suppliers could bid on 
multiple combinations of materials. Suppliers can come back with a number of expressive offers. 
The food industry buyer needed a tool less expressive reverse auction tool to present single item 
bids. Today, commercial software is available to handle the bid processing to find the least-cost 
solution.  
 
The Corn Sweetener Procurement Setting 
 
The relatively low cost of corn sweetener’s made sweeteners processed from corn a viable 
alternative to beet or cane sugars.  Several suppliers, in different locations and in different 
container sizes, manufacture dextrose and corn syrup. Generally, corn sweeteners are contracted 
for one year. The negotiations typically start in December and end sometime during the first 
quarter. Once the contract terms have been agreed upon the buyers order weekly or monthly 
demand requirements throughout the length of the contract without exceeding the contract 
volume limits. Food manufacturing’s sourcing of heterogeneous and differentiated materials is 
initiated once the buyer distributes an RFQ. In an RFQ process, a buyer announces the technical 
specification, lists a number of negotiable attributes and invites potential suppliers to submit 
multidimensional bids on the negotiable attributes. Subsequently, the buyer evaluates the 
submitted bids ranks them according to her preference regarding the negotiable attributes and 
awards the contract to the supplier who has submitted the highest ranked bid. The rationale 
underlying these procurement processes is that the buyer seeks to designate the contract to the 
supplier who offers the best price/performance ratio. The suppliers follow the instructions and 
submit bids without knowledge of the amount of the bid by other participants.  
 
The demand for corn sweeteners had steadily increased on average of 1.7% between 1990 and 
2010 (USDA-ERS). In 2006, the purchasing department was faced with rising corn sweetener 
costs and the inability to sort through computationally complex bids from its suppliers in a 
timely manner. In each of the previous two years prior to 2005 prices for corn sweeteners had 
increased 2-3%. The meat processor purchased nearly 1.7 million cwt. of corn sweeteners valued 
at $2.4 million in 2005. Table 1 shows the estimated annual demand by plant and product 
specification.  
  
Table 1. Quantity purchased by plant 
Plant # Dextrose Corn Syrup Corn Syrup Solids Liquid Dextrose 
 cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt.  
Plant 1 250  1,810   
Plant 2 5,570  220 30,000  
Plant 3 1,950  500 25,000  
Plant 4 6,000  660 40,000  
Plant 5 1,890 43,000 1,512   
Plant 6 3,600  580   
Plant 7 600     
Plant 8 1,650  17   
Total 21,510 43,000 5,299 95,000  
 
 
 
 
 
 2014 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
 
176 
    
Harris and Biere                                                                                                                        Volume17 Issue 3, 2014 
 
The Bidding Event 
 
The buyer’s procurement policy stipulates that only suppliers that demonstrate ability to maintain 
standards of product quality, provide evidence of its financial stability, and can regularly make 
goods and services available for shipment are approved as a supplier. Five corn sweetener 
manufacturers and four food ingredient distributors had been pre-approved to supply the buyer, 
and only those nine were permitted to bid. Previously, the food processor only accepted a single 
bid for each different quality specification or corn sweetener type. This is referred to as single 
bids and there were 20 different possible bids given the supplier’s capabilities and the number of 
locations. In addition, the buyer accepted bids to supply multiple locations with different quality 
specifications. This is referred to as bundle bids. There were 19 different possible bids under the 
single-bid format. Under the bundled-bid format 100 different bid packages were possible, given 
the number of different combinations of sweetener types. Bidders will bid on four products 
originating from the corn wet milling process:  dextrose, corn syrup solids, corn syrup, and liquid 
dextrose.   
  
The buyer used a web -based portal through which buyers and suppliers could interact. The focus 
was to conduct a combinatorial auction to source four types of sweeteners to be delivered in 
specified amounts to each of the buyer’s eight plants located in five states. Bidders will bid on 
four products or a combination of products.  Corn syrup and liquid dextrose are liquids that must 
be stored in tanks, which creates food safety and traceability concern should the company use 
more than one supplier, as the product would be mixed in the tanks. Because the company does 
not want mixing of liquids from different suppliers in the same tank, each liquid supplied to a 
location must come from a single supplier. The firm preapproved nine suppliers—five are 
manufacturers of corn sweeteners and four are distributors. Two suppliers, a manufacturer and a 
distributor, handled all four sweeteners, three handled three of the sweeteners, and four handled 
only two of the sweeteners.   
 
Buyer and Supplier Involvement in eRAs 
 
Disruptive technologies like eRAs change the interactions between the buyers and sellers. The 
problems often center on pricing or agreed upon customer services that are part of contractual 
agreements (Lancioni, 2005). Perceptions of inequity play an important role as changes in 
business processes usually force buyers and sellers to reevaluate the existing relationship. Both 
parties have inputs into the transaction arrangement and both parties expect to reap certain 
benefits that would be equitably distributed. The digital era of purchasing has changed the 
interactions between buyers and suppliers (Sambamurthy and Zmud 2000). The ability to 
negotiate effectively and consummate deals that are both fair and equitable has long been an 
issue of contention in buyer–supplier relationships.  
 
In 2005 and 2006, corn sweeteners were manufactured by five companies: ADM Company, 
Cargill Inc., Corn Products International Inc., Roquette America Inc., and Tate and Lyle 
Ingredients Americas, Inc. (Corn Refiners Association 2006). In addition, corn sweeteners are 
sold through a number of firms specializing in the distribution of food ingredients. Although 
some suppliers view eRAs as a strategy to get the cheapest price regardless of other non-price 
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performance factors, others viewed it as a mechanism to reap the benefits from their scaled 
operations, which are well suited for large customers. The processed meats and corn refiners 
industry have a history that begins with the corn sweeteners being used in the product 
formulation instead of higher costs substitute of beet or cane. Only the carbonated beverage 
manufacturers use more corn sweeteners than the meat processing industry. For the supplier, 
eRAs represent an opportunity for non-incumbents to participate in a neutral marketplace were 
able to freely and independently participate in the e-marketplace (Kaplan and Sawhney 2000). In 
order to be included in the research, the e-marketplace must have met the condition of neutrality. 
 
The buyer paid a fee to use an eRA application developed by CombineNet, a third-party auction 
provider, to help develop the RFQ. CombineNet's core technology platform, REV™ Profit 
Accelerator, analyzed the bids for competitiveness and provided opportunities to analyze 
scenarios that included some less tangible factors in the decision making process. After receiving 
the buyer’s “Letter Of Intent” to purchase corn sweeteners, the suppliers attended a webinar 
hosted by CombineNet to learn how to navigate the website during the auction and to review and 
accept the bidding terms. Training included how to access the website, how to submit bids, 
definition of terms and conditions of the event. The training also covered other topics, such as, 
the process of awarding the winning bid or how to communicate in the event they are unable to 
use the software. During the training sessions the supplier received information about the annual 
demand and pack sizes for each location by product. The bidders were advised their last bid must 
be honored by them and not withdrawn for consideration up to five calendar days after the 
auction ended. The five-day period provided the buyer an opportunity to download the last bids 
into REV™ and include other bids that were not submitted electronically. Bidders could respond 
to the eRFQ by mailing the bids through the U.S. Postal Service or express mail system. The 
buyer manually placed the bids and used the tool to analyze and compare to other bids.  
 
The nine suppliers to submit sealed bids in 2005 were contacted by the buying organization to 
participate in the online bidding event. Each supplier had supplied or had been approved to 
supply the food processor in previous years. The list included five corn refiners and four food 
ingredient distributors.  
 
Results 
 
The single-bid auction and the bundled-bid (combinatorial) auction ran simultaneously.  That is, 
bidders had an option to place a single or a bundled bid in the same web based portal. The 
bidders entered into a password protected website to view the requirements for all corn 
sweeteners by delivery location, packaging size, and to place bids. The bidders were allowed to 
submit bids for the total volume or on a portion of dextrose and corn syrup solids only. Bids for 
liquid dextrose and liquid corn syrup were accepted only for 100% of the volume at any delivery 
location for food safety reasons.   
 
Corn sweeteners provide an opportunity for bidders to combine (bundle) bids. The auction was 
scheduled to last four uninterrupted hours. The software would only receive bids within the 
timeframe of the auction. Each bidding organization input their own single bid or bundled bid 
into the software, listing the price it was willing to sell by location, volume and specification as 
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single units or in bundles. Bidders were able to see their price for a single or bundle and if their 
own bid was a winning bid.  In real time, the buyers were able to view each bid and the bidding 
throughout the entire event. Bidding continued throughout the time period. A bidder who did not 
have a winning bid at the time could, then submit a new bid if the bidder could afford a better 
bid. When time expired, bidders were locked out from submitting bids more bids. 
 
Single Bid Outcome 
 
In the single bid portion of the auction, two bidders met the requirement of supplying entire 
volume of corn sweeteners, see Table 1. A total of 98 out of a possible 180 bids were placed over 
four-hour period. In this auction, the buyer did not select any of the single bids, when 
determining the winning bid. Table 2 summarizes the bidding activity, which includes the 
number of bids, the percent of the demand requirements covered and the number of leading bids.  
We expected the bidders using single bid format to create more bids resulting in more lead 
changes. More bids were expected because of the real-time feedback features and the opportunity 
for non-incumbents to participate in a neutral marketplace to freely participate in the auction.  
 
Table 2. Single unit bid summary by supplier 
 Possible # of bids by 
location 
Actual # of bids by 
location and 
sweetener type 
Percentage of total 
demand met by using the 
single-unit bid approach 
Number of leading 
bids in the single  
bid option 
Suppler 1 20 4 20% 4 
Suppler 2 20 11 100% 2 
Suppler 3 20 20 55% 0 
Suppler 4 20 9 45% 0 
Suppler 5 20 5 25% 0 
Suppler 6 20 14 70% 11 
Suppler 7 20 15 75% 1 
Suppler 8 20 20 100% 1 
Suppler 9 20 1 24% 0 
Total 180 99  19 
 
 
However, the numbers of lead bid changes were less than expected considering the large number 
of bids. Also, the higher number of constraints in single bid format impinged on the bidder’s 
ability to meet the buyer’s total demand requirements. Thus, creating individual bids that did not 
meet the buyer’s volume objective. 
 
Bundled Bid Outcome 
 
The bundled bid auction took place during the same time period as the single bid format. There 
was a 54% increase in the number of bids placed, but considerably fewer bids met the total 
demand requirement (See Table 3). Seemingly more bids were used to cover the buyer’s 
demand, in a way that buyers did not force suppliers into unnecessary constraints. Bidders 
exercised their newfound freedom and flexibility to exercise different bidding options.  
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Table 3. Bundled bid summary by supplier 
 # of bid 
combinations 
Total # of  
bids placed 
% of total demand met 
using the bundled 
bids approach 
# of leading bids 
Using the bundled  
bids approach 
Suppler 1 100 4 4% 1  
Suppler 2 100 26 26% 16  
Suppler 3 100 15 15% 0  
Suppler 4 100 10 10% 1  
Suppler 5 100 6 6% 0  
Suppler 6 100 20 20% 1  
Suppler 7 100 22 22% 2  
Suppler 8 100 25 25% 1  
Suppler 9 100 0 0% 0  
Total 900 128  22  
 
In the bundled bid portion of the auction, a total of 128 bids were placed out of 800 possible 
bids. The buyer selected bids from Suppliers 2, 6, 7, and 8 from the bundled bid option. 
 
Comparison of Combinatorial Auction Option to the Market Price 
 
Because of expanding demand for corn for ethanol production, less was directed to corn wet 
milling over the trial periods. As a result, corn sweetener prices increased and were not 
comparable across the two-year period. In order to quantify the savings from the combinatorial 
auction, we measured the total purchase cost against the same basket of sweeteners at reported 
national prices. In 2005, when the firm used the manual process, the firm paid 1% less that it 
would have paid compared to nationally quoted prices. In 2006 when reverse combinatorial 
auction was used, the firm paid 7.5% less than it would have paid for its entire basket of corn 
sweeteners using nationally quoted prices. Furthermore, the manual process took several weeks 
to run. Tables 4 and 5 show the outcome of the manual and reverse auction format. 
 
Table 4. Savings using the conventional bid process 
Sweetener 2005 RFQ 
quantities 
National 
Average Price1 
Projected 
cost 
Actual price 
paid, manual 
bidding 
Sweetener 
expenditures, using 
simple, manual auction 
Dextrose 10,473 $23.10 $241,926 $23.00    $240,879 
Liquid Dextrose 90,000 $17.75 $1,597,500 $17.50 $1,575,000 
Corn Syrup 41,000 $14.25 $584,250 $14.15    $580,150 
Corn Syrup Solid 1,100 $24.37 $26,804 $26.60      $29,260 
Total 142,573  $2,450,480  $2,425,289 
Conventional Savings      $25,191 
 
Table 5. Savings with the reverse auction 
Sweetener 2006 RFQ 
quantities 
National 
Average price1 
Projected 
cost2 
Actual price 
paid, single bid 
auction 
Sweetener 
expenditures, using 
simple, manual auction 
Dextrose 21,510 $24.10    $518,391 $22.65   $ 487,202 
Liquid Dextrose 95,000 $17.40 $1,653,000 $15.40 $1,463,000 
Corn Syrup 43,000 $14.00    $602,000 $13.90    $597,700 
Corn Syrup Solid   5,299 $23.90    $126,646 $25.60    $135,654 
Total 164,809  $2,900,037  $2,683,556 
Auction Savings         $216,481 
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Compared to national prices, 6 show a greater savings. Savings with the combinatorial auction 
resulted in a 13.6% benefit to the buying organization.  
 
Table 6. Savings using combinatorial auction 
Sweetener 2006 RFQ 
quantities 
cwt. 
National 
average price1 
Projected  
cost2 
Actual price paid, 
combinatorial 
bidding 
Sweetener 
expenditures, 
combinatorial 
auction 
Dextrose 21,510 $24.10 $   518,391 $21.33   $ 458,808  
Liquid Dextrose 95,000 $17.40 $1,653,000 $13.80 $1,311,000  
Corn Syrup 43,000 $14.00 $   602,000 $13.50    $580,500  
Corn Syrup Solid   5,299 $23.90 $   126,646 $29.55    $156,579  
Total 164,809    $2,900,037  $2,506,887  
Auction Savings 1            $393,150 
 
Discussion 
 
Combinatorial auctions tackle more complex spend categories by deploying sophisticated 
advanced sourcing and negotiations tools capable of “optimizing” lowest total cost and highest 
total value, not just the lowest price. These combinatorial auctions improve purchase order 
efficiency and automate back-end financial management (payables, receivables) systems. It 
serves as a transaction facilitator (Peterson et. al 2005). Transaction facilitators generally focus 
on reducing complex, paper-based transactions between buyers and sellers. When tailored to a 
specific industry/type of purchase, these tools can be invaluable in reducing transaction costs, 
dispute costs resulting from errors, and other operating costs. 
 
The findings from the study in 2006 are not only consistent with the expected field research 
which suggest the use of this sourcing technique can create perceptions of opportunism among 
participating suppliers, but provides empirical evidence of multi-attribute purchasing that can be 
used to address the controversies that an eRA is solely a margin- squeezing tool myopically – 
and perhaps opportunistically – applied. Yet Sourcing professionals typically struggle to quantify 
value monetarily because of ignorance of the true cost structure for their own company as well as 
that of their suppliers (Emiliani 2004). This leads to heavy reliance on price comparisons 
(Anderson et al. 2000). Hence, absent sufficient competitive quotes as a basis of price 
comparison, assurance of attaining the best value is difficult. Sourcing professionals are also 
typically risk averse (Bloch and McEwen 2002; Nelson et al. 2001), preferring “an alternative 
whose outcome is known with certainty over one having an equal or more favorable expected 
value but whose outcomes are probabilistic (Puto et al. 1985, 90).” The weighted average cost 
for the entire basket of corn sweeteners purchased using the manual, reverse, and combinatorial 
auctions methods resulted in $17.35/cwt. $16.90/cwt. and $16.09/cwt., respectfully.  
 
1 Average Midwest corn sweetener prices.  Milling and Baking News ingredient prices.  March 3, 2004 to May 25,  
      2004; March 5, 2005 to May 30, 2005; March 14, 2006 to May 29, 2006, Sosland Publishing. 
 
2  Budgeted costs of corn sweeteners based on the forecasted volume and the most competitive price received from  
      the auction. 
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Any shortcoming found by the buyer includes the go/no go decision process associated with 
using new technology. That is, either the eRA will be used or not. The decision to use an eRA for 
its appropriateness to the buyer-supplier relationship and the initial high administrative costs and 
ex ante transactions costs includes organizational decisions that involved senior leaders in the 
firm. The perception of eRAs producing higher transaction costs could dissipate after some 
experience is gained through program implementation. Adopting electronic trading schemes and 
other information technology systems, as applied to other auction settings, have shown that eRAs 
have the potential to lower – not raise – transaction costs in most markets.  
 
The data in this study from 2005 and 2006 provide a before and after view of eRA’s. In this 
empirical study, the buyer is at the crossroads of using the manual process, the burgeoning 
reverse auction tool, and combinatorial auction methods to reach its objective.  
 
In 2008 and 2009, the manufacturer chose a different procurement strategy. The use of the 
combinatorial auction had highlighted the flexibility gains and the result of more competitive 
bidding. In 2008, the manufacturer, built on the sourcing gains of the previous two years and 
negotiated with its current suppliers risk-management-based contracts. Because of the increasing 
volatility of corn prices, the manufacturer negotiated a contract that allowed the food 
manufacturer to manage the input price risks and to pay a tolling or manufacturing agreement 
with the corn refiner. The food industry buyer used its own personnel to manage the corn price 
risk and paid the corn refiner to convert corn into the four corn sweeteners needed for its 
products.  This demonstrates that changing conditions may call for changing sourcing strategies.  
Also, repeated use of CeRA may lead to discovery of ways that vendors might game the system 
or vendors who have not captured a winning bid, may choose not to continue to bid.   
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper we evaluated eRA’s and conventional method. The goals in a winning bid 
determination problem are to find the lowest cost scenario and to reduce the transaction cost of 
buying goods and services. The 2006 results from the single bid auction yielded a costs savings 
when compared against the national prices for corn sweeteners. In 2006, the bundled bid option 
yielded a 14% benefit compared to the national prices and a 4.9% advantage over the single bid 
option. The bidding flexibility provided in the bundled bid format allowed suppliers to bid based 
on their organizational capabilities. That is, it allowed suppliers to provide multiple single-unit 
bids and bundled bids. Furthermore, the new process allowed the buyer to evaluate both bidding 
formats in minutes, compared to weeks when the traditional methods were used.  
 
After the 2006 auction, the food industry buyer adopted the combinatorial tool to help purchase 
corn sweeteners. The price per bushel of corn, however, increased and so did the costs for 
producing corn sweeteners. In 2007 the corn sweetener prices increased, but the prices paid using 
the combinatorial auction was less than the reported prices for corn sweeteners reported in 
industry publications. The combinatorial auction confirmed the food industry buyer’s prices were 
very competitive.  
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The combinatorial auction format generated a significant costs savings by providing the seller 
more bidding flexibility. The costs savings from the event was similar to other firms using 
reverse auction strategies. In addition, the food manufacturer adopted a best practices 
procurement strategy, which reduced its time in determining the winning bid. Reverse auction 
speeds up the process of determining price in multi-attribute auctions. Typically, after the second 
or third time, the marginal benefits are less than the marginal costs of conducting the auction.   
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